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Pursuant to rule 24(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the State submits this brief
in response to new matters raised in cross-respondent's brief.
ARGUMENT
DEFENSE COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO MOVE FOR DISMISSAL
AFTER THE STATE RESTED DID NOT UNDERMINE THE
RELIABILITY OR FAIRNESS OF THE TRIAL
Holding of the Court of Appeals
Addressing defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court of
Appeals first held that a "necessary element" of the concealed weapons offense is proof that
the defendant "did not have a valid permit to carry a concealed weapon." State v. Smith,
2003 UT App 52, \ 32, 65 P.3d 648. Because the State presented no such evidence in its
case-in-chief, the Court concluded that defense counsel was deficient in not moving for
dismissal after the State rested. Id. at fflf 32-33. Turning to the prejudice prong of the

analysis, the Court "conclude[d] that "[h]ad trial counsel raised this lack of evidence, there is
a reasonable probability that the trial court would have dismissed the concealed weapon
charge." Id. at \ 34.
Defendant's Response to State's Claim on Certiorari
On certiorari, the State argues that contrary to the holding of the Court of Appeals, the
lack of a permit is not an element of the concealed weapons offense and that counsel was
not, therefore, constitutionally ineffective in failing to move for dismissal. Brf. of Cross-Pet.
at 23-27.
In response, defendant argues:
The State fails to acknowledge that the Court of Appeals based its finding
on "both section 76-10-504(l)(b) and jury instruction #13D" . . . . Jury
instruction #13D specifically required the State to prove that Smith lacked a
valid concealed weapons permit in order to overcome the proof beyond a
reasonable doubt standard. It is too late for the State to argue it was not
required to give evidence that [he] lacked a valid concealed weapons permit
when the jury instruction required it to do so.
In summary, this Court can decide this issue in favor of [defendant] based
solely on jury instruction #13D, since this instruction included as an element
of the offense that [defendant] lacked a valid firearm permit. The State failed
to prove this necessary element in its case in chief and defendant would have
been entitled to a dismissal based on the insufficient evidence.
Def. Reply Brf. at 4, 6.
Distilled to its essence, defendant claims that notwithstanding the law, there is a
reasonable probability that a motion for dismissal would have been granted because the
instructions reflect that the trial was conducted under the assumption that the lack of a permit
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is an element of the offense. Although this claim has some appeal at first glance, it fails
under Lockhartv. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364,113 S.Ct. 838 (1993).
Prejudice Under Lockhart v. Fretwell
Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984), a defendant
must satisfy a two-part test to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The
defendant must show that: (1) "counsel's performance was deficient," and (2) "the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense." Id. at 687,104 S.Ct. at 2064. The prejudice prong of
the Strickland test "requires [a] showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive
the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Id. As a general rule, prejudice
can be established by showing "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694,
104 S.Ct at 2068.
Strickland's outcome-determinative test is sufficient to assess prejudice in most, but
not all, ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,391,120
S.Ct. 1495,1512 (2000). In some situations, the likelihood of a different outcome cannot be
fairly characterized as legitimate prejudice. Id. at 391-92, 120 S.Ct. at 1512. In Lockhart v.
Fretwell, the Supreme Court held that notwithstanding the likelihood of a different outcome,
prejudice will not be found if the result in the case was "neither unfair nor unreliable," as
judged under the law at the time of appellate review. Fretwell, 506 U.S. at 371-72,113 S.Ct.
at 843-44.
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In Fretwell, the defendant was convicted of capital felony murder for a homicide
committed in the course of a robbery. 506 U.S. at 366-67, 113 S.Ct. at 841. The jury
sentenced Fretwell to death after finding that he committed the murder for pecuniary gain—a
qualifying aggravator for the death sentence. Id. That sentence, however, was presumably
unconstitutional under Collins v. Lockhart, 754 F.2d 258,263-65 (8th Cir. 1985), which held
that pecuniary gain may not be used as a death penalty aggravator in a felony-murder
conviction based on robbery because it duplicates an element of the crime itself, in violation
of the Eighth Amendment. On appeal, Fretwell claimed that his death sentence violated
Collins, but the Arkansas Supreme Court declined to address the claim because it was not
raised at sentencing. Fretwell, 506 U.S. at 367, 113 S.Ct. at 841. The Arkansas Supreme
Court also denied Fretwell's application for post-judgment relief. Id.
Fretwell sought federal habeas relief, arguing that his counsel was ineffective in
failing to make the Collins objection. Id. While the habeas petition was still pending,
Collins was overruled in Perry v. Lockhart, 871 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1989). Fretwell, 506
U.S. at 367,113 S.Ct. at 841. One year later and Perry notwithstanding, the federal district
court vacated Fretwell's death sentence for ineffective assistance of counsel and the Eighth
Circuit affirmed.

Id. at 367-68, 113 S.Ct. at 841. Applying Strickland's outcome-

determinative test, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that because Collins had not been overruled at
the time of sentencing, there was a reasonable probability that but for defense counsel's
failure to object, Fretwell would not have been sentenced to death. Id. at 368, 113 S.Ct. at
841-42. The United States Supreme Court reversed. Id.
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The Supreme Court held that the Eighth Circuit's prejudice analysis was defective
because it "focus [ed] solely on mere outcome determination, without attention to whether the
result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable"—the "touchstone" of an
ineffectiveness claim. Id. at 369-70, 113 S.Ct. at 842-43. The Court observed that "'the
right to the effective assistance of counsel is recognized not for its own sake, but because of
the effect it has on the ability of the accused to receive a fair trial.'" Id. at 369,113 S.Ct. at
842 (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 2046 (1984)).
Accordingly, prejudice will not be found where it "grant[s] the defendant a windfall to which
the law does not entitle him." Id. at 369-70, 113 S.Ct. at 842-43.
The Supreme Court concluded that even though Collins may have controlled at the
time of sentencing and a different outcome was thus likely had counsel made a Collins
objection, there was no prejudice because "the ineffectiveness of counsel d[id] not deprive
the defendant of any substantive or procedural right. . . . " Id. at 372, 113 S.Ct. at 844. The
Court explained that whereas counsel's performance is judged on the facts of the particular
case, viewed as of the time of trial, prejudice is judged under the law existing at the time of
appellate review. Id. at 371-72, 113 S.Ct. at 844. Where the Collins holding was no longer
good law, Fretwell could not demonstrate that he was prejudiced by his counsel's failure to
make a Collins objection—it did "not deprive [him] of any substantive or procedural right to
which the law entitles him." Id. at 372, 113 S.Ct. at 844.
"Lockhart does not supplant the Strickland analysis." Glover v. United States, 531
U.S. 198, 203, 121 S.Ct. 696, 700 (2001). It merely "holds that in some circumstances a

5

mere difference in outcome will not suffice to establish prejudice." Id. at 202, 121 S.Ct. at
700. If the "likelihood of a different outcome [is] attributable to an incorrect interpretation
of the law," prejudice will not be found. Williams, 529 U.S at 392, 120 S.Ct. at 1512.
In sum, an appellate court "may not consider [as prejudice] the effect of an objection
it knows to be wholly meritless under current governing law, even if the objection might
have been considered meritorious at the time of its omission." Id. at 374, 113 S.Ct. at 845
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
Defendant Has Not Established Prejudice Under Lockhart v. Fretwell
Assuming, based on the jury instructions, that the trial court would have ruled that the
lack of a permit is an element of the offense, prejudice would be found under a strict
outcome-determinative analysis. But for counsel's failure to move for dismissal after the
State rested, there is a reasonable probability that the concealed weapons charge would have
been dismissed by the trial court. This was the holding of the Court of Appeals. Smith, 2003
UTApp 52, THI32-34.
But, as explained in the State's opening brief, the lack of a permit is not an element of
the concealed weapons offense. Brf. of Cross-Pet. at 23-27. Defendant argues that it matters
not because, given the jury instructions, a motion to dismiss would have succeeded at that
time. This, however, ignores the teaching of Fretwell Where the lack of a permit is not an
element of the offense, it cannot be said that defendant's conviction was either unfair or
unreliable. See id. at 371, 113 S.Ct. at 843. Defendant "has no entitlement to the luck of a
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[mistaken] decisionmaker." Fretwell, 506 U.S. at 370, 113 S.Ct. at 843 (quotations and
citations omitted).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons and those stated in the State's opening brief, the State
respectfully requests the Court to reverse the judgment of the court of appeals holding that
defendant's trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective in not moving for dismissal after
the State rested. See Smith, 2003 UT App 52, atffif31-35, 37.
Respectfully submitted December 23, 2004.
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UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
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